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Summary findings
In discussions about regional trade arrangements (RTAs),  creation and diversion relative to the 1988 trade policies
one concern has been whether the discriminatory trade  of member countries.
barriers applied in RTAs encourage high-cost imports  The results show the most dynamic (fast-growing)
from member countries at the expense of lower-cost  products in Mercosur's intra-trade generally are capital-
goods from nonmembers. But evaluations of the impact  intensive goods in which members have not displayed a
of RTAs have been hampered by a lack of appropriate  strong export performance in outside markets. Neither
empirical procedures for assessing their influence on the  the RCA indices nor statistics about factor proportions
level and direction of trade.  indicate that Mercosur  has a comparative advantage in
Yeats employs a new index for analyzing the static  those products. The evidence suggests that Mercosur's
trade effects of an RTA. He examines changes in the  own trade barriers are responsible for these trade
regional "orientation"  of exports and shows how this  changes. Most-favored-nation tariffs on the fast-growing
information can be employed in connection with the  products  are above the average for all imports and
"revealed" comparative advantage (RCA) index to  provide Mercosur members with significant preferences.
identify apparent  "inefficiencies" in trade patterns. He  These findings constitute evidence of the potential
applies the approach to statistics on Mercosur  countries'  adverse effects of regional trade arrangements on
exports to determine if recent trade is evolving along  members and on third countries, as judged by the
lines current compatible with these countries'  current  variance in their trade patterns from what current
comparative advantage.  comparative advantage would predict. Although there
He does riot comment on the many other possible  are other possible standards, the counterfactual
effects of RTAs, such as benefits from political  comparison used is an equivalent degree of liberalization
cooperation, enhancing the credibility of reform  on a nondiscriminatory basis. Given the recent
strategies, or dynamic gains from trade. Nor does he  proliferation of RTAs, they highlight the need for further
focus directly on changes in trade with nonmembers,  empirical research on the domestic and international
changes that accelerated rapidly because of the 1988-91  effects of these arrangements, to better assess the pros
liberalization of trade in Mercosur countries. Thus the  and cons of regionalism.
paper does not address the net welfare effects of trade
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As regional trading arrangements  (RTAs)  have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have  posed challenges  to economists  on both intellectual  and policy  levels.  On the former, do
RTAs  stimulate  growth  and investment,  facilitate  technology  transfer,  shift comparative  advantage  towards
high value-added  activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or  induce political stability and
cooperation?  Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient  directions and undermine the
multilateral  trading  system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different  proportions  according  to the particular
circumstances  of each RTA." This then poses the policy  challenge  of how best to manage RTAs  in order
to get the best balance  of benefits  and costs. For example,  should  technical  standards  be harmonized  and,
if so, how; do direct or indirect  taxes  need to be equalized;  how should  RTAs manage  their international
trade policies  in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing  these issues  is one important  focus  of the research  program  of the International  Trade
Division of the World Bank. It has produced  a number of methodological  innovations  in the traditional
area of trade effects  of RTAs and is now starting  to tackle four new areas of research: the dynamics  of
regionalism  (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment,  industrial  location  and migration),  deep integration
(standards, tax harmonization),  regionalism  and the rest of the world (including its effects on the
multilateral  trading  system),  and certain  political  economy  dimensions  of regionalism  (e.g., credibility  and
the use of RTAs  as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes  a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements,  conducted  in collaboration  with the Regional  Vice Presidencies  of the Bank. Several EU-
Mediterranean  Association  Agreements  have been studied  and a joint program  with the staff of the Latin
American  and Caribbean  Region  entitled  "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way. Future work is
planned  on African  and Asian  regional  integration  schemes.
Research findings from the Regionalism  and Development  program have been and will be
released in a number of research outlets  to foster widespread  comment  and debate. While they inform
policy debate within the World Bank, they do not define Bank policy.  Recent World Bank Policy
Research  Working  Papers  include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford  and David Tarr, "Economic  Implications  for Turkey of a Customs
Union  with the European  Union,"  (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small  is Beautiful,  Preferential  Trade Agreements  and the Impact of Country Size,
Market  Share, Efficiency  and Trade  Policy,"  (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism  versus  Multilateralism,"  (No. 1687).(ii)
Planned  future  issues  in this series  include:
(i)  Eric Bond, "An  Operational  Model  for Assessing  Preferential  Trading  Arrangements"
(ii)  Sherry Stephenson,  "Standards,  Conformity  Assessments  and Developing  Countries"
(iii)  Maurice  Schiff  and L. Alan Winters, "Regional  Integration  as Diplomacy"
(iv)  Anthony  Venables  and Diego Puga, "Trading  Arrangements  and Industrial  Development"
(v)  L. Alan Winters  and Won Chang, "Integration  and Non-Member  Welfare:  Measuring  the
Price Effects"
(vi)  Glenn  Harrison,  Thomas  Rutherford  and David  Tarr, "Trade  Policy  Options  for Chile: A
Quantitative  Evaluation"
In addition,  Making  the Most of Mercosur  will  be issuing  papers over the next few months, including:
(vi)  Azita Amjadi  and L. Alan  Winters, "Transportation  Costs  and "Natural"  Integration  in
Mercosur"
(vii)  Claudio  Frischtak,  Danny  M. Leipziger  and John  F. Normand, "Industrial  Policy  in
Mercosur:  Issues  and Lessons"
(viii)  Sam Laird  (WTO), "Mercosur  Trade Policy:  Towards  Greater  Integration"
(ix)  Margaret  Miller  and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical  Evidence  on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports  in Mercosur"
(x)  Malcom  Rowat, "Competition  Policy  within  Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information  about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  D.C. 20433.
An additional  major outlet  for World Bank-sponsored  research  on regionalism  will  be the Annual
Bank Conference  on Development  in Latin America, 1997,  Montevideo,  June 30-July  2, 1997, organized
by the Office  of the Chief  Economist  and the Technical  Department  for Latin America  and the Caribbean
Region,  with the support  of the International  Trade Division  and the Economic  Development  Institute.
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Summary
One concern raised in the discussion  over regional trade arrangements  (RTAs) is whether the
discriminatory  trade barriers applied in these arrangements  encourage  high cost imports from member
countries at the expense of lower cost goods from non-members.  However, evaluations  of the actual
impact of RTAs have been hampered  by a lack of appropriate  empirical  procedures  for assessing  their
influence  on the level and direction  of trade.
This study employs  a new index  for analyzing  one aspect  of an RTA, - its static trade effects. It
examines changes in the regional "orientation"  of exports, and shows how this information  can be
employed in connection  with the "revealed"  comparative  advantage  (RCA) index to identify apparent
"inefficiencies"  in trade patterns. The approach  is applied  to statistics  on Mercosur countries' exports to
determine  if recent trade is evolving  along lines  compatible  with these countries' comparative  advantage.
The paper does not comment  on the many other possible  effects  of RTAs  such as benefits  from political
cooperation,  enhancing the credibility  of reform strategies,  or dynamic gains from trade.  Nor does it
focus directly on changes in trade with non-members  which accelerated  rapidly due to the  1988-91
liberalization  of Mercosur  countries  trade barriers. Thus, the paper  does not address  the net welfare  effect
of trade creation  and trade diversion  relative  to where member countries' trade policies started from in
1988.
The results show the most dynamic  (fast growing)  products in Mercosur's intra-trade  generally
are capital  intensive  goods  in which members  have not displayed  a strong export performance  in outside
markets. Neither  the RCA indices,  nor statistics  relating  to factor proportions,  indicate  that Mercosur  has
a comparative  advantage  in these  products. What factors  are causing  these  trade changes? The evidence
suggests  that Mercosur's own trade barriers are responsible. Most favored nation tariffs on the fast
growing  products are above  the average for all imports  and provide  Mercosur  members with significant
preferences. These  may also be supplemented  by a higher  than average incidence  of nontariff  measures
on imports  from the rest of the world.
These findings  constitute  evidence  of the potential  adverse  effects  of regional  trade arrangements
on members  and on third  countries  as judged  by some variance  in their trade patterns  from what would  be
predicted  by current comparative  advantage.  The counterfactual  comparison  is with an equivalent  degree
of liberalization  on a non-discriminatory  basis. Given the recent proliferation  of RTAs, they highlight  the
need for further empirical  research on the domestic  and international  effects of these arrangements  in
order to better assess  the pros and cons  of regionalism.Does  Mercosur's  Trade  Performance  Raise Concerns  About
the Effects  of Regional  Trade  Arrangements?
Alexander  J. Yeats
I. Introduction
The recent proliferation  of regional  trade arrangements  (RTAs)  among countries  raises several
legitimate  concerns. Primary  among  these is the fear that the new regionalism  will divert attention  from
the multilateral  negotiation  process that GATT (now  the World Trade Organization)  employed  to reduce
international  trade barriers since 1947. Another  is that some regional  trade arrangements  may raise trade
barriers against nonmembers  -- a development  that could seriously  undermine  the achievements  of the
GATT.  Third, it  is recognized  that the discriminatory  trade barriers incorporated  within regional
arrangements  may have undesirable  effects  if they cause sales by members  to displace  those from more
efficient  third countries,  thereby  denying  both consumers  and producers access  to lower cost and superior
quality goods.  However,  assessments  of the influence  of these arrangements  have been hampered  by a
lack of appropriate  and reliable  empirical  procedures  for assessing  their actual  effects.
This investigation  attempts  to determine  whether  two indices, when  used jointly, provide insights
concerning  the extent to which a regional  trade arrangement  distorts trade from patterns expected  on the
basis of efficiency  conditions  and comparative  advantage. As a case study, the analysis  focuses on the
countries  of Mercosur.  Mercosur  was established  under the Treaty of Asuncion, signed on 26 March
1991  by the Presidents  of Argentina,  Brazil, Paraguay  and Uruguay.  Under  the terms  of the Treaty staged
reductions  of tariffs  against  member's intra-trade  were to begin  in June 1991  with the objective  of
removing  all tariffs  on this exchange  by the end of 1994. In fact we start most of our analysis  in 1988
because  Argentina  and Brazil  were already  implementing  some  preferential  sectoral  trade arrangements  by2
then and also to include the effects of the strong multilateral  liberalizations  that Mercosur countries
initiated  around  that period.
Mercosur  is a good case study for this investigation  since it is perhaps the most important  recent
arrangement  involving  developing  countries,  its tariffs  on third country  suppliers  are well above  the post-
Uruguay Round average for industrial  countries  (about 3.9 percent), and at least some of the required
information  on its trade and trade barriers is available.  However, data permitting, the procedures
developed  for this paper can easily  be generalized  to examine  the influence  of other discriminatory  trade
arrangements.
The study proceeds as follows.  First, Mercosur countries' trade statistics are analyzed to
determine  if the direction  and composition  of members  trade has changed  significantly  during the period
when the agreement  was being implemented. Unless  sizeable  changes  occurred  concerns  that trade has
actually been diverted from more "efficient"  producers would appear to be  groundless.  Next, the
characteristics  of a new index  which measures  the changing  regional "orientation"  of exports of specific
goods is examined  and then used to analyze  recent shifts  in the direction  of trade . This index  is compared
with a measure  of "revealed"  comparative  advantage  to show how the two can be employed  jointly for
analyzing  potential  inefficiencies  in trade patterns. Data  drawn from United  Nations  sources  are analyzed
to determine  whether the changing  regional  orientation  of Mercosur's trade during the period when the
agreement was being implemented  was consistent with member countries' comparative advantage.
Supplemental  information  on Mercosur  countries' tariffs  and nontariff  barriers  are analyzed  to determine
how they might  have influenced  trade patterns.  The study closes  with an overall  assessment  of the findings
and their implications  for further  research  on issues  relating  to regionalism.
Two other qualifying  points should  be noted  right  at the outset.  The analysis  in this paper focusses
on only one aspect  of Mercosur  -- its static trade effects.  Many commentators  see other benefits  stemming3
from the agreement such as political cooperation, enhanced negotiating power and better credibility for the
members'  general  economic  reform  programs,  the  possibility  of  achieving  otherwise  unattainable
economies  of  scale  in production,  or  dynamic trade  gains.  These are  legitimate objectives which,  if
achieved, could well more than offset trade distortionary effects. In the present context, however, nothing
can  be  said  about  them.  Second,  although  there  are  other  possible standards,  the  counterfactual
comparison used in this study is an equivalent degree of liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis.
II. Mercosur: Recent Trade Trends
Available data  indicate that member countries'  trade patterns  have  experienced major
changes  since  the  formation of  Mercosur.I  For  example,  Table  I  provides  summary  statistics  on
Mercosur's  intra-trade and  on exports to destinations such as all OECD  countries, NAFTA, or  OECD
Europe.  These data are  shown  for selected periods from  1979-81 to  1994 in order to help determine
when trend changes occurred.2  For the earlier intervals three year periods were used to tabulate data in
order to reduce the influence of any annual irregular variations in the trade statistics -- such as those that
might accompany significant fluctuations in commodity prices.  However, statistics for 1993 and
1994 are shown separately in order to more accurately reflect the recent influence of Mercosur on trade
flows.3
'This analysis  has been  restricted  by data availability  to exploring  trade patterns  only up to and including  1994.
This is sufficient  to identify  the effects  of preferential  trade  policies,  however,  for some preferences  were included  in
the Argentina-Brazilian  sectoral  agreements  at the end of the 1980s  and widespread  preferences  were introduced  in
the transition  period for Mercosur  starting  in June 1991.  However,  our exercise  clearly  sheds no light on events since
1994,  such as the further  progress  towards  a Common  External  Tariff  or any progress  in the non-trade  policy  aspects
of the agreement.  These  remain  on the agenda  for further  research
2Globally  there has been a long-term  decline  in the relative  importance  of the Mercosur  countries.  According  to
UN COMTRADE  data, in 1950  member  countries  accounted  for 4.6 percent  of world  exports, yet this figure fell to
1.4  percent  in 1992.  Since most of the countries  ran substantial  trade surpluses  since  the mid-1980s  Mercosur's  share
of world  imports  is even smaller,  i.e., 1.0  percent  in 1992.
3A more  detailed  analysis  of the annual  trade data used in the construction  of Table 1 strongly  suggests  that 1991
was the year that  intra-Mercosur  trade began  its significant  increase  in relative  importance.  In June of 1991  Mercosur
began  to implement  discriminatory  tariff  preferences  on intra-Mercosur  trade.Table 1.  The Destinations of Mercosur  Countries Trade:  Selected Periods from 1979-81 to 1994.
Of which:
World  of which:  Non-OECD
($ millions)  OECD
Exporter  Years  NAFTA T  USA  Europe  Mercosur
Percent of total exports (%)
Argentina  1994  15,803.3  40.2  13.1  10.9  25.6  59.8  30.4
1993  13,114.4  43.6  11.9  9.7  29.3  56.3  28.1
1990-92  12,187.1  49.5  14.5  11.7  33.3  50.5  16.8
1984-86  7,785.2  44.9  14.4  11.2  28.3  55.1  9.5
1979-81  8,322.7  45.0  11.4  8.7  32.5  55.0  13.4
Brazil  1994  43,355.2  57.4  24.2  20.6  29.0  42.6  13.7
1993  38,679.4  56.1  24.5  20.7  27.6  43.9  13.9
1990-92  32,987.8  63.6  25.2  21.4  32.8  36.4  7.8
1984-86  25,008.6  64.7  29.8  27.2  29.1  35.3  4.7
1979-81  19,556.3  58.2  21.6  18.0  32.7  41.8  8.1
Paraguay  1994  816.8  36.3  7.6  7.0  29.1  63.7  52.0
1993  725.2  45.8  8.2  7.3  38.0  54.2  39.6
1990-92  784.1  41.9  5.0  4.7  36.8  58.1  37.6
1984-86  290.3  48.8  3.7  3.6  43.7  51.2  36.3
1979-81  303.6  52.7  6.6  5.7  41.3  47.3  38.4
Uruguay  1994  1,918.1  30.4  10.1  6.8  21.7  69.6  46.7
1993  1,603.3  32.6  12.3  9.2  21.9  67.3  41.2
1990-92  1,629.9  38.8  13.1  10.1  26.4  61.2  34.7
1984-86  953.3  41.7  14.9  13.5  25.1  58.3  28.4
1979-81  1,021.0  44.0  9.8  8.5  33.6  56.0  30.6
MERCOSUR  1994  61,893.3  51.8  20.7  17.5  27.9  48.1  19.5
1993  54,122.2  52.2  20.9  17.6  28.0  47.8  18.5
1990-92  47,588.9  58.8  21.7  18.3  32.8  41.2  11.5
1984-86  34,037.4  59.5  25.6  23.0  28.9  40.6  6.7
1979-81  29,203.6  53.9  18.2  14.9  32.7  46.1  10.7
Source: All data compiled from United Nations COMTRADE records.  Trade statistics for Mexico are included in the OECD totals.5
The figures  reported in  Table  1 clearly  show the  increasing relative  importance of Mercosur
markets for all four member countries.  For example, in 1984-86 under 10 percent of Argentina's exports
went to Mercosur countries, yet this share rose to 30 percent by 1994.  Although the  1984-86 level was
lower  (about 4.7 percent),  a three fold increase also occurred for Brazil's exports to Mercosur (to 13.7
percent in 1994) while Uruguay's export share rose by almost 20 percentage points (to 46.7 percent). For
all member  countries taken together, the 1994 share of exports to Mercosur (19.5  percent) was almost
three-times the corresponding  1984-86 level.  Overall, the data in Table  1 reveal two key trends  in the
direction of Mercosur's  exports over the last decade: (i) a greatly increased relative importance in intra-
trade; (ii) a stable, or slight decline, in the relative importance of countries that formed  NAFTA and a
reduction in the relative importance of Europe.4
Given that major shifts occurred in the direction of members' trade toward Mercosur,  a related
question is what products are most important in this exchange and how has the composition of exports
changed?  Table 2 lists the value of Mercosur members' exports to each other and also indicates the
share accounted for by several broad product groups.  On average, about 63 percent of Mercosur's  intra-
trade  now  consists of manufactures (this is about 15 percentage points  higher than their  share  in the
region's  global exports) with Brazil, as expected due to its relative size, having a major influence on the
overall average.  Over 81 percent of Brazil's exports to Mercosur now consist of manufactured goods -
4In contrast to the growing  relative importance  of Mercosur markets, trade with NAFTA followed  a less
consistent  pattern. Over the last decade  the share of Brazil  and Uruguay's  exports  to NAFTA  declined  by about 5
percentage  points,  while  the trend  for Argentina  was essentially  flat. For all four Mercosur  countries  the recent trade
trends  suggest  OECD  Europe  is declining  in relative  importance  -- particularly  since  1990-92  -- with the share  of both
Uruguay  and Paraguay's exports to these markets falling  by about 5 percentage  points.  Factors that may have
contributed  to this decline  were further  integration  efforts  within  Europe  and the extension  of trade preferences  to the
former socialist  countries  -- all of which  worsened  the Mercosur  countries'  competitive  position.  Available  statistics
suggest  that European  agricultural  trade policies  had an influence  on the declining  share of Uruguay's  exports. For
example,  in 1974-75  rice was Uruguay's  second  largest  four-digit  SITC  export  to Europe,  but by 1993  these exports
had declined  to about one-fifth  their level in the rnid-1970s.  Linseed  oil, non-wheat  flour, bran, wool  yarn and fiber,
and coffee extracts were also major exports to Europe in the mid-1970s,  but by 1993 no trade in these products
occurred.Table 2. The Product Composition  of Mercosur Countries' Intra-Trade: 1979-81 to 1994.





Food and  Agricultural  Ores and  Mineral  All
Feeds  Materials  Metals  Fuels  Manufactures
Transport &
Exporter  Years  Machinery
Argentina  1994  4,803.2  36.0  2.6  0.7  16.3  44.3  23.6
1993  3,684.0  34.3  0.8  0.7  18.4  45.7  24.1
1990-92  2,045.5  44.1  1.5  1.2  9.0  44.2  16.4
1984-86  739.3  48.7  1.8  1.5  11.8  36.2  10.5
1979-81  1,112.2  51.3  0.8  1.1  9.3  37.5  14.8
Brazil  1994  5,920.0  11.2  0.9  2.8  3.6  81.3  39.6
1993  5,393.7  10.6  1.1  3.2  3.1  81.7  40.8
1990-92  2,564.2  9.7  1.2  5.5  1.4  82.1  38.6
1984-86  1,175.4  13.1  3.3  9.1  4.9  69.5  24.2
1979-81  1,588.1  14.4  3.9  5.0  5.9  70.8  34.6
Paraguay  1994  424.8  41.2  38.8  0.5  0.5  19.1  1.7
1993  287.3  23.2  58.9  0.5  0.6  16.9  1.0
1990-92  295.0  32.8  56.2  0.2  0.6  10.5  0.3
1984-86  105.4  48.8  46.1  - --  5.1  -
1979-81  116.7  36.2  45.7  0.2  0.3  17.6  -
Uruguay  1994  895.7  39.1  2.0  0.8  0.0  57.7  23.9
1993  661.3  39.7  2.4  0.7  0.1  56.8  18.4
1990-92  565.6  45.0  3.3  0.9  0.1  50.4  6.9
1984-86  270.8  51.0  4.4  0.4  1.0  41.8  5.3
1979-81  312.2  49.5  1.7  1.8  --  46.4  9.1
MERCOSUR  1994  12,043.6  24.2  3.0  1.7  8.3  62.6  30.7
1993  10,026.3  21.6  2.7  2.0  8.5  65.0  32.1
1990-92  5,482.0  27.4  4.5  3.1  4.1  60.8  25.0
1984-86  2,290.9  30.7  4.9  5.2  6.4  52.5  16.4
1979-81  3,129.2  31.8  4.1  3.1  6.3  54.6  23.7
Source: Computed from UN Comtrade records.7
this is almost  double  the corresponding  share for Argentina,  and more than four times  that for Paraguay.
Table 2 also documents the overall importance  of the transport and machinery group (SITC 7) in
Mercosur's  intra-trade  as these  goods  comprise  about  one-third  of total  trade.
The second largest product category in intra-trade,  namely, foods and feeds now accounts for
about  one-quarter  of the goods  traded within  Mercosur  (their share in the region's global  exports is about
36 percent) and have been of declining  importance  since  the early 1980s. Both agricultural  materials,  and
ores, minerals and nonferrous  metals also declined  in relative importance  with mineral fuels being the
only product group, in addition  to manufactures,  which increased  its relative share.  In short, Table 2
shows  that manufactures  provided  the catalyst  for the increase  in Mercosur's  intra-trade  with transport  and
machinery  products  being  the most  dynamic  sub-sector  within  this group.
Trade "intensity"  indices  can provide  additional  insights  into the nature and importance  of secular
changes in bilateral trade flows such as those occurring  for Mercosur.  Specifically,  these indices can
highlight the relative importance  of (seemingly  minor) changes in trade between countries that have
relatively  small global trade shares.  If the trade intensity  index takes a value above (below) unity the
countries have greater (smaller)  bilateral trade than would be expected  based on the partner's share in
world trade. When computed  for a given single  point of time the measure is of obvious limited utility
since it does not incorporate  the influence  of factors  such as distance  and languages  on trade. However,
analysis of changes in these indices over time can show whether two countries are experiencing  an
increased,  or decreased,  tendency  to trade with each other. In the case of Mercosur,  the magnitude  of the
5The  intensity  of trade  refers  to a tendency  for two  countries  to trade  more  or less  heavily  with  each  other  based
on factors  such  as their  global  importance  in world  exports  and  imports.  The  measure  has been  used  since  the 1940s
in numerous  analyses  of the direction  and level  of international  trade.  For illustrative  examples  see among  others
Kojima  (1964),  Drysdale  and  Garnaut  (1982),  or Anderson  (1983)8
change in this  index can provide a useful  "yardstick" for  assessing the  importance of the expansion of
intra-trade. 6
Table  3  reports  intensity  ratios  which  were  computed  using  United  Nations  Series  D
COMTRADE  statistics for Mercosur countries' trade  with each other,  and with NAFTA  members for
selected periods from the late  1970s to 1994. The index clearly documents the increased "intensity" of
trade between Mercosur members. For example, Argentina's intensity index for trade with Brazil took a
value of 39 in 1994 which was more than five times its corresponding level in 1979-81 - Brazil's index
for trade with Argentina more than doubles over the same period.  With the exception of those involving
Paraguay, where the quality of trade data is a problem, the bilateral intensity index ratios for Mercosur
intra-trade were markedly higher in 1994 than in any previous period.  These results strongly reinforce
the impression provided by the previous comparisons (Tables 1 and 2) that show a major re-orientation of
exports toward regional markets has occurred.7 A key question is whether these changes are along lines
that are consistent with efficiency and the true comparative advantage of member countries.
6The intensity  of trade  index (Iij)  is defined  for country  i's exports  to country  j as the share  of i's exports  going  to j
(Xij/X,)  relative  to the share of j's imports  (M 1) in world  imports  (Mv). That  is,
(1)  Ii.  =  (XjjXj)/(MjNlM
Brown (1947)  appears  to have been the first among  many to use this index five decades  ago. Some analyses  have
netted  out country  i's imports  from global  imports  in the denominator  of equation  (1).
7In  contrast  to the pattem for Mercosur,  no similar  results  occur for trade with  Canada  and the United States.
With one exception  (Brazil's  exports  to the United  States)  the index  for exports  to both Canada  and the United  States
are below unity.  Although  Mercosur  members' trade with Mexico  produced index values above unity there is
considerable  volatility  in the numbers  (for  example,  Argentina's  index  was 6.0 in 1979-81  and 1.5 in 1994)  and lower
values  were generally  recorded  in 1994  than  in the previous  periods.  The key message  is that  Mercosur  members  are
typically  becoming  much more  trade  dependent  with  each other  and  less so with  NAFTA  countries.Table 3. Trade Itensity  Ratios for Mercosur Countries in Intra-Trade and for Trade with North America.
Trading Partner
Mercosur  North America
Exporter  Year  Argentina  Brazil  Paraguay  Uruguay  Canada  Mexico  USA
Argentina  1979-81  7.4  86.8  27.5  0.3  6.0  0.7
1986-88  14.0  40.5  49.2  0.2  2.8  0.8
1994  --  39.2  92.7  89.4  0.1  1.5  0.7
Brazil  1979-81  9.0  --  80.7  19.0  0.6  3.2  1.4
1986-88  9.9  56.0  31.6  0.6  1.4  1.7
1994  21.7  --  71.5  36.7  0.3  2.1  1.3
Paraguay  1979-81  41.7  11.2  --  45.1  0.0  3.4  0.5
1986-88  48.6  41.9  48.8  0.0  0.2  0.3
1994  25.2  67.2  --  27.7  0.0  0.4  0.4
Uruguay  1979-81  22.7  14.6  52.2  --  0.4  0.6  0.7
1986-8  8  36.0  33.1  22.2  0.2  1.7  0.8
1994  44.7  43.7  36.8  0.2  2.1  0.4
Source: Trade intensity indices computed from UN COMTRADE statistics.10
III. Assessing  to Effects  of RTAs
The previous analysis showed that, since the inception of  the Mercosur transition period,
significant  changes  occurred in the level, composition  and intensity  of member countries'  trade.  Do these
changes appear to have positive, or negative, implications? A common approach to considering  the
effects  of RTAs  is to focus  on changes  in import  shares  -- e.g., Sapir (1992)  on the EU.  This is useful but
it fails to address issues of efficiency  in production. This paper, therefore, proposes  new measures  to
supplement  such analyses  with a different viewpoint  based on exports.  Specifically,  it asks whether  the
trade changes were consistent  with member countries' current comparative  advantage  - whether the
increased intra-Mercosur  trade was in sectors where Mercosur countries had evidenced an ability to
compete in markets where they were not shielded  by preferential  trade arrangements.  One way to
address this question  would be to deternine whether  Mercosur  was also able to successfully  export the
fastest  growing  products  in intra-trade  to third countries.  In other  words, does the exchange  in these goods
meet the "test of the marketplace." Several indices  are available  for addressing  this question  including
measures of global market performance  and trade orientation,  and those based on the factor (labor and
capital)  intensities  of different  products.
The first of these  measures  used in this context  is a "regional  orientation"  index  (Rj) for Mercosur
exports  of product  j which  is defined  as,
(2)  Rj  =  [x÷ - Xj]-  [xOj  XtO] 100
where xrj and xj  represent  the value of exports of j  in Mercosur's intra-trade  and to third countries
respectively. Similarly,  Xtr  and Xt, reflect  the total value  of member  countries'  exports  within  and outside
the arrangement. This regional  orientation  (RO)  index  takes  the ratio of the share of a product  in exports11
to the region to the share of the product in exports to third countries. The index value ranges between
zero and infinity  with a value of unity indicating  the same  tendency  to export the good to members  and
nonmembers,  while  increasing  values  indicate  a greater tendency  to export  to regional  markets.
Several specific points should be noted with regard to the properties of this index. First, it
conveys only limited information  about trade patterns if computed for a single point in time. The
geographic  orientation  of trade is determined  by various factors  such as comparative  advantage,  transport
costs, or trade barriers in alternative  markets. However, inter-temporal  comparisons  of this index over
relatively short periods can provide useful information  on the way the geographic  pattern of trade is
changing.  Second, in the short to medium-term,  changes  in comparative  advantage,  transport costs, or
relative tastes should be minimal so index value changes  are likely to be more heavily influenced  by
factors such as differential  changes  in trade barriers (such as those which accompanied  the formation  of
Mercosur).  The reader should  also note  that, if examined  in isolation,  the percentage  changes  in exports  of
different goods within a regional arrangement  can be misleading  as to the influence  of the arrangement
since they convey no indication  as to how demand for products in third markets was changing. For
example, it is possible that products with the highest  growth rates within  Mercosur  could be reorienting
away from the region  if exports  to third  markets  were growing  even  faster. The regional  orientation  index
does not suffer from this defect  and can convey  useful  information  about  changing  trade patterns.
In addition  to the RO measure,  a second index  which reflects "revealed"  comparative  advantage
can also be computed  for each country  in the arrangement  and for each traded  product. This measure  (Ci)
is defined  as,
(3)  C  [Xoj Xto]  [xWj* XW*] 10012
where xj*  and X.*  represent world exports of product j and total world exports exclusive of the intra-
trade of the RTA member countries.  Regional trade is excluded in order to more accurately reflect the
capacity of Mercosur members to compete evenly in markets where discriminatory trade arrangements do
not provide an "unnatural" edge.8 As such, direct comparisons of the two indices provide an indication of
the  extent to which Mercosur distorted exports from patterns consistent with comparative advantage.
Although they  do  not measure  import diversion directly,  they provide  closely related  information by
allowing one to  infer whether the additional trade generated by  Mercosur was primarily  in products  in
which Mercosur countries had low enough costs to be competitive in third markets.  If not, they suggest
that the additional trade within Mercosur could have been replaced by more efficient outside suppliers.9
This study will test the use of these indices in this context using actual trade data.
Before proceeding,  it should be noted that there  are  additional empirical procedures  that  can
provide useful supplementary information concerning changes in the composition and direction of trade
that accompanied the formation of Mercosur.  Specifically, Table 4 lists the 30 three-digit SITC processed
products that met two separate criteria: (i) they recorded at least one-quarter of a million dollars in intra-
trade in 1988 (this lower limit was set to prevent the tests being biased by marginal products, while 1988
was selected as a period prior to the implementation - and likely the anticipation - of major preferences);
and (ii) that registered the highest 1988-94  compound annual growth rates in trade among Mercosur
8RCA  indices  are generally  only computed  for processed  goods  or manufactures  because  trade in agricultural
products  is distorted  by export  incentives  and trade  barriers  which  are likely  to obscure  whether  a country  has a real
comparative  advantage,  or disadvantage,  in these  products.  The present  analysis  does not attempt  to derive revealed
comparative  advantage  indices  for agricultural  products  and other  primary  commodities.  As such, the present  analysis
is based on  128  three-digit  SITC products  that include all manufactured  goods as well as a number of processed
foodstuffs  and processed  raw materials.  Equation  (3) is a modified  version  of the normal RCA  formula  in that intra-
Mercosur trade is excluded  to prevent preferential  trade among members from obscuring the true comparative
advantage  of Mercosur  members.
9The issue is essentially  whether RTAs foster "high cost" imports  at the expense  of "low cost'  ones.  The
traditional  calculations  of trade diversion  based on import data infer  this from the displacement  of imports  from non-
partners by those from partners, implicitly  comparing  partner  and non-partner  costs  by their relative  competitiveness
in the pre-RTA  regional  market. The supplementary  view developed  here makes inferences  about 'high" and 'low"
costs by implicitly  comparing  the relative  competitiveness  of partner  and non-partner  goods  in world  markets.Table  4. Dynamic  Products  in the Recent  Intra-Trade  of Mercosur  Countries.
Exports  to Mercosur  RO Index  RO Index  Factor  Growth
Change  Intensity*  Rate
Commodity  (SITC)  1988  1994  1988
Non-Alcoholic Beverages (111)  349  26,238  2.35  46.12  162  85.4
Tobacco Manufactures (122)  2,032  112,681  0.95  0.91  210  77.5
Articles of Plastic (893)  4,225  95,535  12.45  -7.52  86  56.1
Alcoholic Beverages (112)  4,137  81,671  1.87  4.61  182  53.1
Perfumnes  and Cosmetics (553)  4,766  86,282  5.22  8.16  160  51.2
Fumiture (821)  3,972  66,213  1.15  -0.10  60  49.5
Iron and Steel Castings (697)  287  3,696  0.30  0.41  145  44.1
Power Machinery Non-Electric (711)  25,140  290,687  0.40  0.79  105  41.9
Road Vehicles Non-Motor (733)  3,118  35,854  2.23  4.65  90  41.7
Wood Manufactures (632)  1,472  16,689  0.43  -0.10  80  41.5
Machines for Special Industries (718)  10,763  120,617  0.93  0.04  113  41.2
Structures and Parts (691)  1,783  19,834  0.72  1.05  105  41.1
Prepared Meat (011  -013)  21,934  237,912  0.17  0.23  102  40.6
Road Motor Vehicles (732)  206,996  2,112,750  1.25  3.17  122  39.4
Plywood and Veneers (631)  3,707  35,630  0.20  0.16  57  38.2
Lace and Ribbons (654)  1,386  13,157  3.56  2.29  68  37.9
Special Textile Products (655)  4,945  46,919  0.88  0.59  69  37.9
Prepared Sugar (061-062)  11,456  102,655  0.30  0.07  140  36.8
Prepared Dairy (022-024)  23,495  204,019  4.31  18.17  180  36.2
Metal Manufactures, nes (698)  5,984  51,430  0.90  0.87  84  36.0
Electric Power Machinery (722)  14,278  121,717  1.18  -0.33  88  35.8
Materials of Rubber (621)  3,636  30,780  3.13  3.13  100  35.7
Glassware (665)  5,381  45,017  2.21  2.88  107  35.5
Nails, Nuts and Bolts (694)  3,021  24,782  2.86  0.81  88  35.1
Preserved Fruit (053)  4,486  36,053  0.05  0.08  116  34.7
Domestic Electrical Equipment (725)  12,568  97,322  2.19  3.76  92  34.0
Base Metal Household  Equipment (697)  5,592  40,452  2.72  -0.84  79  32.7
Clothing Not of Fur (841)  19,342  138,805  0.63  0.71  64  32.5
Metal Tanks and Boxes (692)  3,960  28,099  2.97  -0.09  82  32.3
Copper (682)  3,001  21,161  0.54  0.05  120  32.2
ALL ABOVE PRODUCTS  417,213  4,344,658  1.49  3.06  118  41.0
The higher the index the higher the capital intensity of the production process. Industries with a index value of 100 would have a labor/capital intensity that was average for all manufacturing activity. For
information on how the index is derived see Lary (1968) or World Bank (1992).
Source: Derived from United Nations Comtrade Statistics.14
members.  In addition, two other statistics are given.  First, the 1988 regional orientation index is shown
along with the 1988-94 index change.  The intention here is to indicate the extent to which a reorientation
of trade toward the region contributed to each product's  dynamism. Second an estimate of each product's
relative labor (capital) intensity in production is also given.'0 This index was drawn from a World Bank
study and takes a value of 100 for products whose labor intensity is average relative to all manufacturing
activity,  while  increasing values  above  this  level  identify goods that  are  more  capital  intensive  in
production  (conversely,  the  index  will  decline  below  100 for  products  that  are  increasingly  labor
intensive).  Since economic theory holds that developing countries do not have a comparative advantage
in  capital  intensive  goods the  table attempts to  determine  whether  trade  has  been  distorted  in  this
direction. it
'°The  factor intensity  for industry  j (Lj)  is defned as,
(4)  L)j =  (Vj - Nj) - (Vt +Nt)-  100
where Vj and V, represent  value  added  in industry  j and all US manufacturing  respectively,  while Nj and N, represent
the number  of workers in the industry  and all manufacturing  activity.  Two points  should  be noted. First, studies  by
the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  (Lary 1968)  show  that  products  manufactured  by labor  intensive  processes
in the U.S. are also manufactured  by relatively  labor  intensive  processes  in other  countries,  although,  quite clearly,
the levels  of use may differ. On this basis  Lary  justified  the use of US Census  of Manufactures  data for computation
of the index. Second,  the reader  should  note that  there is an inverse  relation  between  the numeric  value of the index
and the labor intensity  of a given product.  That is, the lower the numeric  value  the higher the labor intensity.  See
Yeats  (1989)  for details  concerning  the computation  of the index  and the results  reported  in Table  4.
"Comparative  advantage  explanations  of the composition  of trade between  developed  and developing  countries
generally  focus on factor  proportions. That is, countries  with a relative  abundance  of low cost labor should  export
"labor intensive"  products  to countries  where  capital  is relatively  abundant. Empirical  tests  by Lary (1968), Tuong
and Yeats (1975), and Yeats (1989) confirm  the accuracy  of factors proportions  as a predictor  of trade flows.
Although  theory is less conclusive  in explaining  the composition  of trade between  developing  countries  (Deardorff
1982), the question  of how exports  of capital  intensive  goods  from one developing  country  to another  can compete
with exports from industrial  countries  has often been raised. Dongues  (1987) concludes  that preferential  trade
arrangements  among developing  countries foster this exchange.  Havrylyshyn  (1987) and Havrylyshyn  and Wolf
(1987)  also indicate  that  domestic  and trade  policy  distortions  promote  these  exports  while Corbo  and Meller  conclude
that "distortive  trade and production  policies  increase  the production  of more capital intensive  goods for export to
other  developing  countries". Second,  although  countries  may import  capital  intensive  goods  from industrial  countries
and labor intensive  goods from developing  countries  nearly all models  suggest  exports will be concentrated  in one
part of the factor  intensive  spectrum.15
Several important points emerge from Table 4.  First, much of the dynamism in the intra-trade of
these goods is associated with a shift in the regional orientation of exports toward Mercosur.  For example,
in 1988 the trade weighted share of these products within Mercosur was approximately 49 percent higher
than that for other destinations (as reflected in an index value of 1.49), yet by  1994 this index value rose
more than two-fold to 4.55.  Road motor vehicles (SITC 732) played a major role in this overall shift as
intra-Mercosur trade in these goods increased by a factor of more than 10, i.e.,  in value terms from $207
million to over  $2.1 billion in  1994.  Second, it should be noted that 24 out of these  30  "dynamic"
products recorded a shift in the regional orientation index toward Mercosur, with half of the 30 products'
indices more than doubling.'12
Although the results are somewhat mixed, a second important point is that the dynamic products
generally consist of goods that are relatively capital intensive in fabrication.  Overall, the 30 items listed in
Table  4 have a  factor intensity index ratio of  118 - which indicates they are  18 percent more  capital
intensive than average for all manufacturing activity.  In contrast, an investigation by Yeats (1989) that
employed these same data determined that the recent capital intensity of Hong Kong, Republic of Korea,
and Taiwan (China) exports were 20 to 25 percent below average,  while Singapore's ratio was about 2
percent higher.  This point is troubling since economic theory holds that countries like those in Mercosur
should not have a comparative advantage in the production of relatively capital intensive goods such as
those that are growing most rapidly in intra-trade.
'2The possibility  exists  that exports  to third markets  (particularly  of agricultural  products)  may have been greatly
constrained  by high tariffs and nontariff  measures.  In these  cases, RO index  values  could rise because  of restrictions
in third markets  and not the more  favorable  tariff  treatment  of member  countries  in inter-block  trade. There is reason
to believe,  however,  that this situation  occurs infrequently.  World Bank-UNCTAD  records show that most of the
products  listed  in Table  4 do not encounter  major OECD  restrictions  (the processed  foodstuffs  are an exception).  In
addition,  this study  shows  (see Table  7) that Mercosur  provides  sizeable  trade preferences  on intra-trade. It is also
possible  that idiosyncracies  in demand  patterns  and in the ability  to produce  certain varieties  of goods made trade
between  Mercosur  countries  increase  disproportionately  fast as a result of the MFN liberalization.  This  is sufficiently
unlikely,  however,  that  the burden  of proof  must lie with  advocates  of this view.16
Table 5 provides  a different perspective on the shifts which are occurring in Mercosur's  intra-
trade,  and  the  efficiency implications of  these changes.  Shown here  are  the  30 product  groups  that
experienced the greatest reorientation of trade toward the region (as measured by the  RO index) over
1988-94.  In addition, the modified 1994 RCA index (based only on trade performnance  in third markets)
for each item is also shown.  By comparing the two measures one can determine whether the goods which
are assuming a steadily increased importance in intra-trade are among those which Mercosur  has been
able to  export competitively to  third  countries. In other  words,  have  Mercosur countries  shown  any
evidence of export  strength in these goods in "independent" markets where  they  are not protected by
discriminatory trade arrangements.13  In addition, we also look at changes in the comparative advantage
index which can convey useful relevant information about whether Mercosur was becoming more, or less,
internationally competitive in these products.
The  results reflected in Table  5 clearly are  discomforting. For the  30 groups  with the largest
regional  shift only two (SITC 046 - Wheat Meal or Flour and SITC 042.2  - Glazed Rice) have  RCA
indices slightly above unity, while the index averages only 0.27 for the other items. These results strongly
suggest that Mercosur members experience a strong comparative disadvantage for these goods in markets
that do not incorporate discriminatory trade measures against outsiders.  14  Special note should be made
13The RO and RCA indices both depend on the shares of each good in Mercosur's total exports.  To
the extent that these are measured with error the two will be negatively correlated.  There is no reason to
be particularly worried by this, however, because trade shares are fairly robust at this level.  Besides,
nearlyi  all our analysis relates changes in RO to the starting level of RCA.
Actually,  Mercosur  countries  do receive  OECD  preferences  for some of these  products  under the Generalized
System  of Preference  (GSP)  schemes  that  were adopted  in the early 1970s.  These GSP preferences  have since  been
eroded by tariff cuts in the multilateral  trade negotiations  and now average about one to two percentage  points for
products  which  are eligible  for such treatment.  However,  the margins  have not changed  over the period which  is the
focus of analysis. In contrast,  Table 7 in this study  shows  that preferences  Mercosur  countries  extend  to each other
are far higher. Tariff differentials  set at these  levels  clearly  have the potential  to signif.cantly  displace  exports  from
third countries.Table 5.  Products with the Largest Change in Regional Orientation Toward Mercosur Markets Over 1988 to 1994.
Exports ($000)  Regional Orient Index
RO Index  1994 RCA
Change  Index
Commodity (SITC)  1988  1994  1988  1994
Non-Alcoholic Beverages (111)  349  26,238  2.35  48.47  46.12  0.05
Lead (685)  642  219  3.03  25.42  22.39  0.00
Prepared Dairy (022-024)  23,495  204,019  4.31  22.49  18.17  0.13
Non-Wheat Meal or Flour (047)  4  954  0.05  17.26  17.21  0.04
Perfumes and Cosmetics (553)  4,766  86,282  5.22  13.37  8.16  0.14
Wheat Meal or Flour (046)  65  35,051  0.22  5.67  5.44  1.08
Cork Manufactures (633)  18  721  1.18  6.30  5.13  0.05
Preserved Vegetables (055)  23,404  48,745  17.66  22.61  4.95  0.13
Articles of Paper (642)  15,763  72,249  2.16  7.10  4.93  0.20
Road Vehicles Non-Motor (733)  3,118  35,854  2.23  6.88  4.65  0.13
Alcoholic Beverages (122)  4,137  81,671  1.87  6.48  4.61  0.19
Agricultural Machinery (712)  39,608  121,294  2.08  5.88  3.81  0.45
Domestic Electrical Equipment (725)  12,568  97,322  2.19  5.94  3.76  0.23
Road Motor Vehicles (732)  206,996  2,112,750  1.25  4.42  3.17  0.45
Materials of Rubber (621)  3,636  30,780  3.13  6.26  3.13  0.32
Glassware (665)  5,381  45,017  2.21  5.09  2.88  0.38
Synthetic Fibers (266)  13,381  21,170  6.28  9.14  2.87  0.11
Rice Glazed or Polished (042.2)  22,583  148,079  9.28  11.65  2.37  1.03
Lace and Ribbons (654)  1,386  13,157  3.56  5.86  2.29  0.22
Food Preparations nes (099)  7,727  45,412  2.10  4.35  2.25  0.28
Structures and Parts (691)  1,783  19,834  0.72  1.77  1.05  0.39
Tobacco Manufactures (122)  2,032  112,681  0.95  1.86  0.91  0.39
Textile Yarn and Thread (651)  26,523  118,120  0.85  1.73  0.88  0.90
Metal Manufactures nes (698)  5,984  51,430  0.90  1.77  0.87  0.33
Nails, Nuts and Bolts (694)  3,021  24,782  2.86  3.66  0.81  0.28
Non-electric Power Machinery (711)  25,140  290,687  0.40  1.20  0.79  0.45
Nonfur Clothing (841)  19,342  138,805  0.63  1.34  0.71  0.27
Plumbing and Lighting Equipment (812)  3,819  14,363  2.23  2.93  0.70  0.13
Electrical Distributing Machinery (723)  6,821  35,775  1.55  2.22  0.67  0.26
Glass (664)  4,851  25,079  1.27  1.93  0.65  0.36
ALL ABOVE ITEMS  488,345  4,058,540  2.83  5.97  3.14  0.4218
of the fact that the revealed  comparative  advantage  index  averaged  only 0.07 for the top 5 products listed
in the table.
Analysis  of the 1988-94  changes  in Mercosur's RCA indices  for these products reveals another
disturbing  pattern. The average  index  value  actually  declines  from 0.42 to 0.31 over the six year period.
Furthermore,  the reductions  are widely  distributed  within  the group with 21 of the 30 (70 percent) items
recording lower RCA values in 1994 than in the earlier period. In short, the evidence suggests that
Mercosur  is becoming  less, rather than more, internationally  competitive  in products  where trade is most
rapidly  re-orienting  toward  the region.
A key question  is what factors  are responsible  for this surprising  reorientation  of trade? Evidence
suggests  that Mercosur's own trade barriers are the cause.  The analysis  that follows  (see Table 7) will
show that goods, such as those listed in  Table 5,  generally are protected by higher than average
discriminatory  trade measures. As a result, local producers would have a strong incentive  to seek the
higher  prices available  on sales to Mercosur  markets. Given the option  of selling  locally  at higher  prices,
producers  would have a strong incentive  to divert exports from more competitive  foreign  markets to less
competitive  regional markets.  As a result, RCA indices would decline for the products which were
growing  fastest  in intra-trade.
Figure 1 provides  a graphical  view of the major changes  that were occurring  within  the product
composition  of Mercosur's  intra-trade.  The upper half of the figure  shows  aggregate  RCA indices  for the
specific 15 product groups (defined  here at the two-digit  SITC level) that accounted  for almost all (92
percent) of the 1988-94  change in Mercosur's intra-trade  on the vertical axis with the width of each
product's bar drawn proportional  its share of the total increase.  As indicated  three groups, namely,
transport  equipment,  non-electrical  machinery,  and electrical  machinery  accounted  for over one-half  of
the total 1988-94  increase  in Mercosur's  intra-trade  even  though  the RCA indices  for these  products  wereFigure 1. Regional Orientation and RCA Indices for Products Accounting for 92 Percent of the 1988-94 Change in Mercosur's  Intra-Trade.
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very low, i.e., in the 0.25 to 0.40 range. To help  interpret  these  data the lower half of the figure  plots the
matched  regional orientation  index for each group. For these 15 product groups a consistent  pattern of
(very) low RCAs and high regional  orientation  is generally  observed. In only one product group (iron
and steel), which accounted  for only about 3 percent of the intra-trade  increase, did Mercosur  achieve  a
revealed comparative advantage index above unity. In short, Figure 1 provides little evidence that
Mercosur's intra-trade  is evolving  along lines  consistent  with current comparative  advantage.  Rather the
products  recording  the largest  shift toward  the region  are those for which Mercosur  has not demonstrated
an ability  to export  competitively  elsewhere.
While the previous  discussion  (Table 5) focussed  on extreme  (positive)  changes in the regional
orientation index, Table 6 provides a composite  view of the complete  profile of intra-trade changes
occurring  within Mercosur. Specifically,  1988 and 1994  regional  orientation  indices  for each individual
product  was computed  and ranked  in descending  order based on changes  in this index. Next, this ranked
distribution  was divided  into deciles  and 1988  and 1994  average  RCA  and RO indices-were  computed  for
each group. Table 6 shows  these average  indices  and also compares  the 1988-94  change  in the RO index
with Mercosur's average  RCA indices.
As before, the results  presented  in Table 6 reveal a pattern that differs from that expected  on the
basis of the comparative  advantage  measure.  Specifically,  for the first decile products, i.e., those that
registered  the largest shift toward the region (an average  RO index increase of 9.63) the average 1994
Mercosur  RCA index  was only 0.24.  Similarly,  for the second  decile  products  the RO index change  took
a value of 2.64, in spite of the fact that the average RCA index for these goods was under 0.50, and
actually  declined  from its earlier 1988  level.  Average  RCA index  declines  occur for the top three decile
product groups which indicates  Mercosur was becoming  less, not more, internationally  competitive  for21
goods  experiencing  the greatest shift toward  intra-trade. Since  the goods  in these three deciles enjoy  well
above  average  levels  of protection  against  third countries  (see Table 7) domestic  producers  would  have
a strong  incentive  to divert  trade to local markets  (which  would  cause  the RCA  indices  to decline)  in order
to profit from the higher  prices.
Mercosur's regional  orientation  indices  show a fairly consistent  tendency  to move counter  to the
revealed  comparative  advantage  measure  over the decile  ranges. For example, in the sixth through tenth
decile  products, where the 1994 RCA index ranges between 1.99 and 3.68, the orientation  of exports is
moving  rapidly away from the region.  5  The key point that follows  from this complete  profile of trade
changes  is that the regional  orientation  of exports  is growing  most rapidly  for products  where there is little
evidence  that Mercosur  has a current  comparative  advantage.
IV. Mercosur's  Trade Barriers  and Recent  Trade  Changes
What caused  the observed  pattern of trade changes  to diverge  so widely  from that expected  on the
basis of efficiency  conditions  and current  comparative  advantage? First, it seems  highly  unlikely  that they
were due to changes in natural factors such as freight costs.  Transport  costs can be reduced by the
adoption  of new shipping  technologies,  or through  major improvements  in port and handling  facilities,  but
these are unlikely  to occur in a relatively  short  time period such as that covered  by this study. A second
possibility  is that the discriminatory  nature  of Mercosur's  own trade  policies  was responsible. The
'5The  fairly  high  index  values  in the fifth  through  tenth  deciles  are in part  due to the  fact  that  the  distribution  of
index  values  is right  skewed.  That  is, the index  is bound  by zero,  but can  range  (in theory)  to infinity.  One  or two
products  in a decile  group  with  high  RCA  index  values  may  have  influenced  the  results  for  these  decile  groups.Table 6. Mercosur's Average Decile Regional Orientation Index and RCA Index Values for 128 Processed Product Groups
Mercosur Intra-Trade  Regional Orientation  Percent of Industries  Regional
($000)  Index  in Decile Rage with  RCA Index  Orientation
an RCA Over Unity  Index
Change
Decile Range  1988  1994  1988  1994  1988  1994
First Decile Products  127,939  810,619  3.84  13.47  7.6  0.43  0.24  9.63
Second Decile Products  325,573  3,033,899  1.63  4.26  7.6  0.64  0.48  2.64
Third Decile Products  212,759  1,027,964  1.39  1.86  15.4  0.88  0.54  0.47
Fourth Decile Products  302,175  1,303,419  1.50  1.67  46.1  0.96  0.99  0.17
Fifth Decile Products  108,996  597,859  1.11  1.16  38.5  2.15  2.14  0.04
Sixth Decile Products  167,733  840,060  1.33  1.12  38.5  2.65  3.68  -0.21
Seventh Decile Products  287,832  595,436  1.15  0.78  69.2  3.04  3.60  -0.37
Eighth Decile Products  222,842  469,499  1.73  0.96  46.1  2.05  2.60  -0.77
Ninth Decile Products  373,557  516,184  3.48  1.33  46.1  0.86  2.06  -2.14
Tenth Decile Products  226,930  514,461  31.82  10.17  23.1  0.24  1.99  -21.65
2,356,437  9,709,400
Source: Computed from the data presented in Appendix Table 1.23
Mercosur  countries  had been liberalizing  imports  on a most favored  nation  basis for several years when,
in 1991, they introduced  their first widespread  set of preferential  tariff  cuts.  This is the year for which  the
UN COMTRADE records indicate that intra-block  trade accelerated  sharply.  If the most dynamnic
products in Mercosur's intra-trade, or those that were shifting most rapidly toward the region, had
disproportionately  high preferences  this would suggest  that Mercosur  trade barriers were a factor in the
re-orientation  of exports. Evidence  relating  to this point could  come from an analysis  of the margins  of
preference  that Mercosur's  trade barriers  provide  member  countries.  Are these  high enough  to account  for
the increases  in intra-trade  that occurred during the 1991-94  period when tariff preferences  on all but a
few products  were being  implemented.
Several, sources of statistics  on Mercosur's  tariffs and NTBs are available  for analyses  of these
points. First, a cooperative  project between  UNCTAD  and the World  Bank, named  SMART  -- Software
for Market Analysis and Restrictions  on Trade, compiled statistics on many OECD and developing
countries' pre-Uruguay  Round  trade barriers  (see UNCTAD  and the World  Bank, 1989 for a description
of the SMART database  and operating  system). Since both Brazil and Uruguay's 1988/89  tariffs were
included  in these records (along  with data on Brazil's nontariff  measures)  they provide  partial details on
Mercosur's  trade barriers  at very fine levels  of detail. These  two countries  account  for over 60 percent of
Mercosur's total imports  with the result  that the SMART  records  provide  a useful profile of the structure
of external  protection. However, it should be noted that Mercosur countries  (particularly  Brazil) have
subsequently  implemented  major  unilateral  MFN tariff  reductions  so the earlier statistics  are not a reliable
guide  to current levels of protection. For this reason, post-Uruguay  tariff data were drawn directly  from
the World Trade Organization's  Integrated  Data Base (IDB). Where there were known exceptions  and
departures from the reported WTO statistics  (as was the case with tariffs and nontariff restrictions  on
automobiles)  these were incorporated  in the data. These  statistics,  like those in SMART,  are recorded at24
the national tariff  line level so the two sources of information are comparable.  Given that patterns  of
protection change only relatively slowly, the SMART and IDB records will, together,  afford reasonable
insight into the patterns ruling over the early 1990s.
As far  as intra-block preferences  are concerned,  Article 5  of the Treaty  of  Asuncion,  which
created Mercosur,  required "progressive, linear and automatic tariff reductions" be implemented starting
in 1991 "with a view to arriving at zero tariffs for the entire tariff area by 31 December 1994." Although
there was some slippage in this objective, the World Trade Organization (October 1996) reports  "that by
the end of 1994 intra-regional trade between Brazil and its Mercosur partners has been duty-free since
1 January 1995 except for 29 tariff line items" (out of 9,107).'6  The same report quotes (p. 23) Brazilian
authorities as stating that duty free trade covered close to 95 percent of intra-regional (Mercosur) trade in
1994. From these observations we conclude that the reported external tariffs will be highly correlated with
the degree  of preferences  offered on  intra-Mercosur trade.17 As such,  the average  levels of current
"applied" tariffs were computed and these were taken as a measure of intra-block preferences. 18
A second attempt at identifying discriminatory trade barriers focuses on nontariff barriers.  Two
measures of the potential importance of NTBs are available. The first, a NTB trade coverage ratio shows
the share of all  imports (measured in current values) subject to nontariff barriers.  The second,  often
16Behar  (1995) reports  that the first preferential  reduction  in Mercosur's tariffs took place in June of 1991. A
1994  background  study  for a World Bank  country  economic  memorandum  gave the schedule  along which tariffs on
intra-trade  were then being reduced.  This  schedule  set a minimum  margin  of preference  of 47 percent and augmented
the margins  of preference  which  already exceeded  this minimum  (due to previous  arrangements)  by an additional  7
percent. A 7 percent cut every six months  would  follow  until the zero tariff objective  was fulfilled.  As noted, in the
case of Brazil,  this  objective  was achieved  for all but 29 tariff  line  items.
17Moreover,  if in fact  the bulk of the preferences  was not implemented  until late 1994  the trade reorientation  we
reported  above would  have arisen from partial preferences  and so one might  expect  an even  larger effect to follow
over 1995  and 1996.
18The  1996 tariff statistics  reported  in Table 7 are drawn from the WTO's Integrated  Data Base and are the
average  duties actually  applied  by Argentina,  Brazil  and Uruguay  to imports  from non-Mercosur  sources.  They are
based on the lower of the following  two rates: (i) the legally  bound tariff, or (ii) the current MFN applied rate.
Primary products  and raw materials,  which  typically  have lower  import  duties  are not included  in the tabulations. A
description  of the methodology  used in computing  these averages  can be found  in Finger,  Ingco and Reincke  (1996,
pp. 1-21).25
referred  to as a  "frequency" index, shows the share of all tariff line products covered by  one or more
nontariff restrictions.19 Although these measures have some limitations (see Laird and Yeats,  1990 for a
discussion), they show the extent to which nontariff restrictions are available to reinforce the effects of the
block preferences.  The  data  refer  to  1988 and  have been  subject to  significant change since  then.
However, again appealing to the normal persistence in patterns of protection and noting that the Treaty of
Asuncion provides for the removal of NTBs on intra-bloc trade, the data very likely identify the elements
of discrimination.  We recognize that this is all a bit tenuous, but we believe there  is content in these
statistics.  Given the tariff data, however, our thesis that discrimination exists does not depend on these
NTB measures.
Table  7  summarizes statistics relating to these barriers.  The data strongly suggest that  tariff
preferences,  and the protection they provide for intra-trade, have been a major factor behind the recent
pattern of trade changes.  For example, Mercosur tariffs on the most dynamic products -- the first decile
19The  frequency  index (F) for importing  country  j shows  the percentage  of tariff lines covered  by some pre-
selected  group  of nontariff  measures  and  is defined  by,
(5)  Fj  =  (ED1 N 1 + Nt)  100
where Ni is tariff line item  i, Di is a dummy  variable  that  takes  a value  of unity  if one or more NTBs  is applied  to the
item  or zero otherwise,  and N, is the total  number  of lines  in the product  group. The above  summation  is made  over
all countries  exporting  to importing  country  j.  Similarly,  the trade  coverage  index (C 1) is defined  as,
(6)  Cj  =  ((ZDi,t  m  V;,t  n)/TVi,t  .).  100
where Vi,tn  is the value  of imports  in tariff line  item i in year (t-n)  and Di,t  is a dummy  that takes  a value  of unity  if
an NTB is applied  to the item and zero otherwise.  If n and m are zero the index is based  on current trade values,
otherwise  base  year weights  are used.
The UNCTAD  records contain  information  about the following  types of nontariff  restrictions  which are
included  in the frequency  and coverage  ratio tabulations:  tariff quotas, anti-dumping  duties, restrictive import
authorizations,  total prohibitions, suspended import authorization  licenses, anti-dumping  investigations,  state
monopolies, differential health  and  safety regulations, differential prohibitions based  on  non-commercial
considerations.  The records may understate  the current importance  of some restrictions  like anti-dumping  actions
since  they do not incorporate  data on the surge  in new cases  that  occurred  in 1992-93.26
products from Table 6 averaged 18 percent -- about 7 percentage points higher than the average duty on
all goods in the ten decile groups.  Items falling in the second and third decile groups are protected by
discriminatory tariffs of about  17 percent,20  after this the margins in the fourth  through tenth  decile
groups typically decline to about 10 to  12 percent.  To put these numbers in perspective they are  far
higher than the average tariff margin provided by the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) (about 2
percentage points) which many developing countries strongly sought to preserve in the Uruguay Round
negotiations - on the basis that they strongly enhanced the competitive position of their exports - and also
far higher than the average margin within the European Union (below 3 percentage points for  industrial
goods).  Moreover, even if we added in agricultural goods and looked at the Mercosur Common External
Tariff  for  the  year  2000,  the  average  margin  of preference  would  be  about  10 percentage  points.
20In 1995  the average for the second  decile  would  have been 22.4 percent as the Brazilian  tariff on autos was
raised to 70 percent on some imports. Recent  actions  within  the World Trade Organization  accent the importance
which  member  countries  attach  to the discriminatory  trade  barriers  against  third countries  in this sector. For example,
a  recent (November 1, 1996)  Journal of Commerce article (entitled "WTO  Criticizes Brazil for Straying from
Reform")  quoted  a WTO report  which  said  the auto  industry  "is  the most  highly  assisted  manufacturing  activity  in the
country  with effective  protection  estimated  at over 250  percent."  The Journal  also noted that a strict tariff quota had
been set on auto imports and that the United States, Japan, the European Union and South Korea had all filed
complaints  with the WTO alleging  discrimination  in Brazil's auto trade regime. Second, the fact that these new
protectionist  measures  had to be introduced,  in spite  of the major  expansion  of domestic  production,  suggest  that any
scale economies  accompanying  the regional  arrangement  are proving  very  elusive.Table 7. Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers on Mercosur's Imports
Average
1988-94 Change in  External Tariff (%)  Nontariff Barrier Ratio
Mercosur Intra-Trade  Regional Orientation
($000)  Index Change
Frequency  Trade
Decile Range  1988  1996  Ratio  Coverage
First Decile Products  682,680  54.4  18.1  41.9  83.5  9.63
Second Decile Products  2,708,326  46.9  16.7  24.5*  36.6*  2.63
Third Decile Products  815,205  56.1  17.5  42.1  51.8  0.47
Fourth Decile Products  1,001,244  46.0  9.6  17.7  28.7  0.17
Fifth Decile Products  488,863  46.0  10.3  20.4  8.3  0.05
Sixth Decile Products  672,327  43.6  16.7  17.1  4.3  -0.21
Seventh Decile Products  307,604  38.4  10.9  18.5  27.5  -0.37
Eighth Decile Products  246,657  39.1  11.7  27.1  31.9  -0.77
Ninth Decile Products  142,627  38.4  9.0  4.0  5.4  -2.15
Tenth Decile Products  287,531  40.7  10.9  8.2  28.2  -21.65
*Includes Brazil's recent restrictions on automobile imports and domestic automobile assembly regulations.
Source: Computed from SMART and the WTO Integrated Data Base.28
Similarly, Table 7 shows that nontariff barriers were also structured along lines that would
reinforce the trade distorting  effects of the agreements  preferential  tariffs.  According  to the UNCTAD
data, nontariff  restrictions  were applied  to about  21 percent of all tariff line items, which is almost one-
half the corresponding  ratio (41.9 percent) for Mercosur's first decile products.  Similarly,  the trade
coverage  ratio for products  falling in the first three deciles  averaged  almost  60 percent (about  3 times the
ratio for all imports)  and reached 84 percent  for the first decile  group.
V. Policy  Implications
This paper identified  dramatic  changes  in the Mercosur  countries' trade patterns over the period
1988-94  and particularly  over its latter  half. It also argued  that these  are substantially  due to the changes  in
trade policy and probably  mainly those introduced  under Mercosur  transitional  arrangements.  Statements
of this kind depend on comparing  actual data with a counterfactural. Two natural candidates  present
themselves.  The counterfactual  implicit in  this paper is  that, but  for these policy developments,
Mercosur's trade  patterns would not  have changed much and  that the  shift towards apparently
uncompetitive  capital-intensive  intra-block  trade would not have occurred.  The implication  is that if the
Mercosur  countries  had achieved  an equivalent  degree of liberalization  on a non-discriminatory  basis they
would  have maintained  a more efficient  import  structure,  paying less and/or obtaining  better goods, and
they would have purchased  more from their trading  partners  outside  the block. 21 Given the size of the
trade effects  identified,  the evidence  that preferences  and the application  of industrial  policies  within  RTAs
can be distortionary  is both compelling  and disturbing. It is true  that one could  imagine  other explanations
21The  reader  should  specifically  note  that  trade  patterns  in 1994  are being  compared  with  those  in 1988  and  not
with  some  "free-trade"  counterfactual.  The  assumption  is that 1994  would  have  been  no more  distorted  than 1988.
We  believe  that  the  latter  is less  distorted  geographically  because,  in the  earlier  period,  trade  barriers  were  applied  on
a most-favored-nation  basis  with  the  exception  of a few  sectoral  arrangements.Table 7.  Tariffs and Nontariff  Barriers on Mercosur's  Imports
Average
1988-94 Change in  External Tariff (%)  Nontariff Barrier Ratio
Mercosur Intra-Trade  Regional Orientation
($000)  Index Change
Frequency  Trade
Decile Range  1988  1996  Ratio  Coverage
First Decile Products  682,680  54.4  18.1  41.9  83.5  9.63
Second Decile Products  2,708,326  46.9  16.7  24.5*  36.6*  2.63
Third Decile Products  815,205  56.1  17.5  42.1  51.8  0.47
Fourth Decile Products  1,001,244  46.0  9.6  17.7  28.7  0.17
Fifth Decile Products  488,863  46.0  10.3  20.4  8.3  0.05
Sixth Decile Products  672,327  43.6  16.7  17.1  4.3  -0.21
Seventh Decile Products  307,604  38.4  10.9  18.5  27.5  -0.37
Eighth Decile Products  246,657  39.1  11.7  27.1  31.9  -0.77
Ninth Decile Products  142,627  38.4  9.0  4.0  5.4  -2.15
Tenth Decile Products  287,531  40.7  10.9  8.2  28.2  -21.65
*Includes Brazil's recent restrictions on automobile imports and domestic automobile assembly regulations.
Source: Computed from SMART and the WTO Integrated Data Base.28
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Mercosur's trade patterns would not  have changed much and  that  the  shift towards apparently
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21The  reader  should  specifically  note  that  trade  patterns  in 1994  are  being  compared  with  those  in 1988  and not
with some  "free-trade"  counterfactual.  The  assumption  is that 1994  would  have  been  no more  distorted  than 1988.
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for the trade pattern changes  observed,  but none seems nearly so direct, or so likely, as the role of trade
policies  and preferences.
A separate, albeit related, question based on the second counterfactual  is whether Mercosur
countries' trade was more distorted in 1994 than in 1988. Unfortunately,  analyses of trade data alone
cannot  answer  this question  completely.  Although  the trade pattern  is more distorted,  it is possible  that the
efficiency  with which  domestic  and foreign  goods in general  were traded off against each other (roughly
speaking  the level of trade) increased  sufficiently  to offset this.  Comparing  1994 with 1988, it is likely
that the Mercosur  trade arrangements  both created  and diverted  trade, and it is also well  to remember  that
even trade diverting customs  unions can improve  economic  welfare if they lead to declines  in producer
and consumer  prices. Thus, while Mercosur  trade policies are distortionary  relative to what could have
been achieved,  they may well  have been  positive  relative  to where member  countries  started  from.
This discussion  raises an important  semantic  point: what is Mercosur? Broadly speaking, the
sample period for most of the analysis  (1988-94)  witnessed  two classes of policy change: the general
liberalization  of trade barriers facing all partners, which  was stronger over 1988-91  but not restricted  to
that period, and the preferential  intra-block  liberalizations,  which occurred mainly after the Treaty of
Asuncion  in 1991. Since  data on the precise  path and structure  of tariffs  were not available  to us, we had
no choice other than to consider  only the combined  effects  of these two liberalizations,  which we have
loosely referred to as "the effects of Mercosur" rather than "the effects of the trade policies of the
Mercosur  countries."  Thus our estimate  of "Mercosur  effects"  includes,  strictly  speaking  incorrectly,  both
the effects  of the general trade barrier liberalizations  over 1988-91  (and any continuing  tariff reductions
after 1991) that produced an impressive  surge in global imports and the effects of the Argentinean-
Brazilian  bilateral sectoral  liberalizations  over 1988-91. The formers inclusion  will lead us to understate30
the discriminatory  effects of Mercosur proper and the latter to overstate it. 22 We did not pursue the
alternative  approach  of limiting  the analysis  of trade changes  to the period since the Treaty of Asuncion
precisely  because  it was unclear  to us how much  discrimination  was built into 1991  and how much  general
liberalization  after 1991  was strictly  due to the Mercosur  Agreement. Indeed, given  that Mercosur  has so
little institutional  structure  outside  its members' governments,  it did not even seem very meaningful  to try
to disaggregate  trade policy  changes  into "Mercosur"  and "national"  components.
Given these observations,  however, the findings of this study appear to constitute  convincing
evidence  that regional  preferences  can affect  trading  patterns  strongly  and in ways  that can be detrimental
to both member and nonmember  countries. The changing  trade patterns analyzed  in this study suggest
that Mercosur  was not internationally  competitive  in sectors where intra-trade  was growing  most rapidly,
and that domestic  producers  were re-orienting  exports  to local  markets  in order to charge the higher  prices
associated with the most restrictive trade barriers. This reduces third countries' potential exports to
Mercosur and under many circumstances  can reduce their welfare relative to  an  equivalent non-
discriminatory  trade liberalization.23  Moreover,  it suggests  that consumers  in Mercosur's  internal  markets
are being denied  access  to higher  quality  and lower  priced goods  due to discriminatory  trade barriers. For
example, in one case study involving  Mercosur's  trade restrictions  and regulations  governing  domestic
production  and imports  of automotive  products  Chudnovsky  et. al (1996) conclude that "the quality of
produced (within  Mercosur)  vehicles  continues  to be much lower and prices much higher than in other
22It  should  also  be noted  that  the  restrictive  auto  regime  is strictly  a national  rather  than  a Mercosur  one. Some
commentators  on this paper  have argued  that Mercosur's  effect  has been  to constrain  the restrictiveness  of this
regime.
23See  Winters  (1996)  for a discussion  of the  effects  of regionalism  on third  countries.  Devlin  (1996)  attempts  to
provide  an alternative  perspective  on the  trade  creation  and  diversion  effects  of Mercosur.31
producing countries."  The authors also note that any  "technological externalities" associated with  the
automotive regulations have been quite limited.24
The findings may  also have  implications for  the World Trade  Organization's  consideration of
RTAs. If Mercosur is consistent with WTO's rules (Article XXIV) for the formation of customs unions --
the working party examining this has yet to report -- the results of this paper might provide a useful input
into a  review  of those  rules. The  Uruguay Round Understanding on  Article  XXIV  calls for  regular
reviews  of  RTAs  and,  for  new  arrangements,  proposes  that  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  be
analyzed.  The empirical evidence examined in this study accents the importance of these functions. Given
the recent proliferation of RTAs, this study's findings highlights the need for further empirical research on
the domestic and international effects of these arrangements in order to better assess the pros and cons of
regionalism.
24A forthcoming  article by two researchers  at the MIT Sloan School and Wharton School  downplays  the
proposition  that regional  integration  arrangements  are a useful vehicle  for countries  to employ for improving  their
international  competitiveness.  Specifically,  Toulan  and Guillen  (1996)  argue that "some  claim that  trading  blocks  can
serve as a testing ground  for eventual  global  integration  as they allow firms to gradually  develop  internationalization
skills. In many ways  this argument  is similar  to the infant  industry  protectionist  argument,  in which  barriers  are used
to protect  domestic  industries  until they develop  the skills necessary  to compete  internationally.  Unfortunately,  such
policies  have a fairly poor record in Latin America.  The same  potential  fate could lie in store for firms operating
under  the protection  of Mercosur,  in which  their level  of competitiveness  is confined  to the demands  and  pressures  of
the Mercosur  market, rather  than the global  one. While  it is still  too early to tell whether  firms are in fact viewing
Mercosur  as a launching  pad, interviews  with  managers  do not revel  that  they are in fact doing  this."32
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